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Abstract
The focus of this article is on equivocation in Japanese televised interviews, broadcast 
over a 14-month period in 2012-2013 (before and after the general election of 
December 16, 2012). An analysis was conducted of responses to questions by three 
different groups (national politicians, local politicians, and nonpoliticians). Results 
showed a striking level of equivocation by both national and local politicians, who 
together equivocated significantly more than nonpoliticians. Furthermore, national-
level Diet members equivocated significantly more than local politicians, and both 
coalition groupings when in power were significantly more likely to equivocate than 
when in opposition. The results were interpreted in terms of the situational theory of 
communicative conflict and also in terms of cultural norms characteristic of Japanese 
politics and society. The failure to consider the role of such norms, it is proposed, 
represents an important omission in the original theory of equivocation.
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Televised political interviews provide easy and accessible ways to identify, under-
stand, and evaluate social and political issues and distinguish among the individuals 
and groups that endeavor to solve related problems and their measures. As a genre of 
the mass media, political interviews, set up to produce face-to-face confrontational 
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and challenging encounter of journalists and politicians for an “overhearing audience” 
(Heritage, 1985), have become in recent years one of the most important means of 
political communication in Japan.1
With the increased exposure of the Japanese public to political information through 
the media, particularly television (Feldman, 2011), broadcast interview programs are 
a valuable channel through which to follow public policy developments, distinguish 
between political candidates and competing groups and their stances, and evaluate the 
various political alternatives. Despite this and with a few exceptions (e.g., Furo, 2001, 
pp. 37-52; Tanaka, 2004; Yokota, 1994), there is a lack of knowledge in Japan on how 
political affairs talks are organized in this type of media discourse, the nature of the 
interaction between interviewers and interviewees, their communicative style when 
addressing or replying to questions, and the strategies employed by the participants to 
pursue their goals. This study aims to fill some of the existing gaps in the literature. 
Based on data gathered over a 14-month period before and after the general election of 
December 16, 2012, this article aims to explore the communicative patterns and 
responsiveness of high echelon members of the Japanese National Parliament (Diet) 
as well as local-level political leaders throughout broadcast talk shows and to compare 
them with those of nonpoliticians. It focuses specifically on how Japanese politicians 
cope with the questions posed to them during televised political interviews.
Political Interviews
Broadcast political interviews have their own distinctive features and a defined set of 
rule and norms dominated by the roles and functions of the interviewer(s) and the 
interviewee(s). First, these interviews are staged performances that take place with the 
participation of journalist(s) and political officer(s) or expert(s) and in which the ulti-
mate addressee is absent from the actual event. The interview is enacted for the benefit 
of an “overhearing audience” whose probable expectations shape what is being said 
and how. Both the interviewer and the interviewees (politicians or experts) will have 
the general viewers in mind. The interviewer will consider the consumers of their talk 
show and simultaneously also colleagues in their organization; success or failure in 
their performance can determine their future career and their status within their peers 
and the corporation. For politicians, attending interview programs is often taken as 
their best tool for political communication: an opportunity to speak “directly” to hun-
dreds of thousands of people, an occasion to advance their ideas and thoughts to the 
electorate and their fellow politicians, an instance for enhancing positive images of 
their own and their political groups, and a ground for attacking their political oppo-
nents and challengers.
Second, there is the pattern of “turn-taking system” that noticeably defines the con-
flicting functions of interviewer(s) and interviewee(s) as both are working to generate 
discourse for the “overhearing audience” in a two-way process. Thus, the interviewers 
are responsible for determining the topic for discussion, monitoring the discourse’s 
time, and adhering to specific ritualistic patterns, including introducing interviewees 
and concluding the interview session. At the same time, interviewers also pose 
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questions and challenge interviewees to specify and explain their positions and views 
on variety of issues, and they are expected to do so by keeping a balance between 
adversarialism and objectivity, maintaining a stance of neutrality by not favoring spe-
cific politicians or a given political group. The interviewees’ task is to reply to these 
questions to best effect for both themselves as individuals and for the political groups 
or institutions that they represent (e.g., Clayman & Heritage, 2002). Challenging these 
roles allocations would be regarded as a violation of the primary rules that structure 
the political interview. However, deviations from these normative expectations may 
not necessarily be acknowledged, sanctioned, or repaired (Weizman, 2008, p. 58). 
Given the advantages that the interview offers politicians to speak to a large number of 
audience and promote their own and their groups’ agenda and images, they may strive 
to exert control over the interview. Thus, they may break the talking procedure, inten-
tionally change the subject before or after giving a response, disregard the questions 
they are asked by repeating statements irrespective of whether they have any relation 
to the interviewer’s questions, and shift the agenda and topic selection, a phenomenon 
which is termed “agenda shifting procedures” (Day, 1991; Harris, 1991; Heritage & 
Greatbatch, 1991).
A further distinctive feature of political interviews is interviewee vagueness, eva-
siveness, or equivocal communication style (the terms are interchangeable as sug-
gested by Bull, 1994) as they hedge from providing direct answers to questions they 
are asked. Thirteen strategies used by politicians to avoid giving direct answers were 
identified by Jucker (1986), 35 different forms of nonreply were identified by Bull and 
Mayer (1993), and 8 evasive tactics used by political interviewees were identified by 
Hu (1999). Reply rates, defined as the proportion of questions which receive a direct 
answer (Bull, 2003), are very low. Less than 40% was reported in televised interviews 
broadcast in the United Kingdom (Bull, 1994; Harris, 1991) and in Taiwan (Huang, 
2009), whereas less than 10% was reported in political interviews in Japan (Feldman, 
2004, pp. 76-110).
The Theory of Equivocation
Bavelas and her colleagues (Bavelas, Black, Bryson, & Mullett, 1988; Bavelas, Black, 
Chovil, & Mullett, 1990) proposed that it is the interview situation, rather than politi-
cians’ devious, slippery personalities, that create strong pressures toward equivoca-
tion. They regard equivocation as a form of indirect communication, ambiguous, 
contradictory, and tangential, which may also be incongruent, obscure, or even evasive 
(Bavelas et al., 1990, p. 28).
Bavelas et al. (1990) theorized that individuals typically equivocate when they are 
placed in an avoidance-avoidance conflict (or a communicative conflict), whereby all 
possible responses to a question have potentially negative consequences for the 
respondent, but nevertheless a response is still expected by interlocutors and audience. 
Such conflicts are especially prevalent in interviews with politicians because of the 
nature of the interview situation. Thus, interviewers may have an interest in controver-
sial, sensitive, and divisive issues, and thereby put pressure on politicians to choose 
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among undesirable alternatives, in which all potential responses may damage the 
image of the politicians or alienate part of the electorate (Bavelas et al., 1990, pp. 246-
249). Notably, the argument underlying the work of Bavelas et al. (1990) is that equiv-
ocation does not occur without a situational precedent. In other words, although it is 
individuals who equivocate, such responses must always be understood in the situa-
tional context in which they occur, known as the Situational Theory of Communicative 
Conflict.
Bavelas et al. (1990) further proposed that equivocation can be conceptualized in 
terms of four dimensions, namely, sender, content, receiver, and context. Thus, the 
sender dimension refers to the extent to which the response is the speaker’s own opin-
ion; a statement is considered more equivocal if the speaker fails to acknowledge it as 
his or her own opinion or attributes it to another person. Content refers to comprehen-
sibility, an unclear statement being considered more equivocal. Receiver refers to the 
extent to which the message is addressed to the other person in the situation, the less so 
the more equivocal the message. Context refers to the extent to which the response is a 
direct answer to the question; the less the relevance, the more equivocal the message.
A modification of equivocation theory has been proposed by Bull and his col-
leagues in terms of what are called threats to face (Bull, 2008; Bull, Elliott, Palmer, & 
Walker, 1996). Bull and his colleagues proposed that questions may be formulated in 
such a way that politicians constantly run the risk of making face-damaging responses 
(responses which make themselves and/or their political allies look bad, and/or con-
strain their future freedom of action). Bull et al. (1996) further proposed that politi-
cians need to defend three faces: personal, political party, and that of significant others 
and that communicative conflicts may occur when all the principal ways of respond-
ing to a question are potentially face-damaging, thereby creating pressures toward 
equivocation.
This article uses this framework of the equivocation theory to analyze televised 
interviews with Japanese politicians and detail their attitudes toward responding to a 
wide range of questions posed to them during interviews. Specifically, the main focus 
of this article is on whether and to what extent Japanese politicians equivocate during 
televised programs, thereby to evaluate the significance of these talk shows in the 
broader context of political communication in Japan.
The Japanese Case
Exploring Japanese politicians’ responses to interview questions is of special concern 
not only because, as stated above, of the lack of knowledge about this country but also 
because of the possible effect of the cultural context on the exchanges of messages 
between interviewers and interviewees. This cultural context, detailed below, which is 
almost totally disregarded by Bavelas et al. (1990) in their theory, can and do play a 
role in effecting the interviewees’ responses patterns. This context presents however a 
methodological problem that we try to overcome with some modifications of Bavelas 
et al.’s original research. Here, we refer to two aspects related to the cultural context 
(draws on Feldman, 2004, pp. 50-52 & pp. 79-80).
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First, precision, clarity, and forthrightness are not necessarily seen as virtues in 
Japanese communication style, even in many situations where those qualities are val-
ued in the West. Japanese, in general, limit themselves to implicit language, avoid 
taking extreme positions, and even regard vagueness as a virtue and an ambiguous 
speaking style acceptable. To avoid leaving an assertive impression, Japanese tend to 
depend more frequently on qualifiers such as “maybe,” “perhaps,” “probably,” and 
“somewhat.” Since Japanese syntax does not require the use of a subject in a sentence, 
“qualifier-predicate” is the dominant form of sentence construction. Omission of the 
subject often creates a great deal of ambiguity. In addition, Japanese tend to prefer 
understatement and hesitation, and avoid explaining or expressing things precisely or 
pointedly and often use indirect expressions. Although there are multiple pronouns 
that mean “I,” there is a definite tendency to avoid their use as much as possible. 
Instead, Japanese tend to use expressions like “many people say . . . ” and “it is said . 
. . ” in order to express an opinion without making a personal commitment to it. All 
these communication-related configurations suggest the large extent of equivocation 
one can find in sessions when individuals are asked to reveal their own opinion on 
variety of issues or when asked to share information related to their work and experi-
ences (e.g., the sender, the content, and the context dimensions).
An equally important trait is related to the way politicians in particular construct 
their discourse in accordance with the conventional wisdom in Japan that says that real 
feelings and opinions about politics and personnel are not supposed to intrude on the 
“front world,” where things must be kept calm and controlled. Thus, the speech of 
Japanese politicians (and government officials) generally fits either into the category 
of honne, meaning honest and informal, the actual, genuine intent, or that of tatemae, 
which is formal, ceremonial, “pretense” designed for public consumption. A person 
may discuss a particular issue from either standpoint: honne or tatemae. When the 
speaker discloses genuine thoughts, opinions, and judgments, regardless of the 
expected reception they will receive, that is honne. When statements are carefully 
worded to restrict the conversation to official positions, or when the speaker sticks to 
ambiguous expressions without revealing honest opinions and feelings, that is tatemae. 
For public officials, honne and tatemae are the two sides of the Japanese political coin; 
they signify the difference between public disclosure and private discretion.
Politicians thus present their views with varying degrees of openness (honne) or 
fuzziness (tatemae) depending on the circumstances in which they find themselves. 
When speaking before large public gathering such as at party conventions, a large 
press conference, or at Diet committee meetings that are often aired live, politicians 
employ tatemae by generally expressing little beyond official, broadly accepted views 
in the administration or their political groups. Policy speeches delivered traditionally 
by the prime minister to both houses of the Diet upon establishing a new administra-
tion are often primarily occasions to expound the official party or Cabinet line. In fact, 
one linguistic trait peculiar to tatemae statements is that the speaker avoids using 
vocabulary that indicates any judgment or does not makes a commitment to any posi-
tion. Such speakers hedge their comments with words like probably, perhaps, or could 
be. They frequently use terms like positively or constructively to give a vague 
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impression that they intend to move on an issue at some unspecified time in the future, 
assiduous or energetic to convey a sense of effort, and to endeavor or work hard when 
they intend to take no personal responsibility. The speaker is thus able to appear to say 
something, loading their speech with much professional jargon and abstractions, with-
out revealing any personal opinion, and to phrase comments in ways that make it 
impossible for the listener to determine where the speaker stands on a particular issue.
Talking in tatemae euphemisms—by blurring opinions, commitments, and emo-
tions, or by presenting only official, widely accepted views—is the most common form 
of public speaking and perhaps the safest way for Diet members and government offi-
cials to express themselves and still remain politically viable. Tatemae allows them to 
protect their own feelings, thoughts, and opinions from public scrutiny; to avoid identi-
fying with or advocating particular ideas; and to limit the risk of embarrassing col-
leagues or offending anyone who holds different political views. Japanese Diet 
members, especially those occupying or aspiring to higher positions, who are invited to 
televised political interviews, have to thus pay a great deal of attention to what they say 
and how they say it in public (the sender, the content, and the context dimensions).
Hypotheses
On the basis of both Bavelas et al.’s (1990) original theory of equivocation and the 
revisions proposed above in terms of cultural context, the following two hypotheses 
are proposed:
Hypothesis 1: We expect that when responding to televised interview questions, 
especially on delicate or controversial issues, Japanese politicians will tend to reply 
the tatemae way, use ambiguous and unclear expressions (the content dimension). 
Because of their sensitivity to the electorate, supporters, and to colleagues from 
different political groups, politicians would also incline to conceal their own views 
and opinions, and thus will less reveal their explicit views (the sender dimension) 
and even evade full replies (the context dimension). To skillfully use the interview 
venue to advance ideas and thoughts that they hold, and to enhance positive images 
of their own and their political groups, politicians will tend to “directly” address 
more often the electorate, the “overhearing audience,” rather than the interviewees 
who tackle them with questions (the receiver dimension). In particular, in compari-
son to any other group of nonpoliticians, who do not depend on supporters and are 
less concerned with public opinion and stances held by other legislators, politicians 
will incline more to present the formally accepted views, to aim their messages at 
people outside the studio, to be less explicit in their remarks, and thus to equivocate 
more in their replies to questions.
Hypothesis 2: We assume there will be differences in responses between members 
of the ruling and the opposition camps. Once in government, ruling parties’ mem-
bers are more susceptible to communicative conflicts that will lead them to equivo-
cate when replying to questions: They will be more cautious in expressing their 
personal views on a variety of issues (sender), will incline to carefully weight their 
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statements to limit them to formal positions of the administration (context), and 
stick to ambiguous opinions and judgments (content). Members of the opposition 
camps, on the other hand, who face less conflictual questions and situations and 
have less responsibility in the decision-making process on both the domestic and 
the international levels and “can say what they like” will incline to less equivocate 
than members of the first group.
Method
The Interviews
The study was based on 194 live interviews (145 with politicians, 49 with nonpoliti-
cians) broadcast over a period of 14 months (May 2012 to June 2013) on three televi-
sion programs: Puraimu Nyūsu (Prime News; 147 interviews), Shin Hōdō 2001(New 
Broadcast 2001; 25 interviews), and Gekiron Kurosufaya (Gekiron Crossfire; 22 
interviews).
These programs are transmitted nationwide in Japan on a daily or weekly basis, 
except for rare occasions when replaced by coverage of special events like the high-
school baseball championship games held each summer. Puraimu Nyūsu is broadcast 
through BS (Broadcasting Satellite) every day from Mondays through Fridays (20:00 
to 21:55), Shin Hōdō 2001 every Sundays (7:30 and 8:55), and Gekiron Kurosufaya 
broadcasts through BS every Saturday (10:00 and 10:55).
All the programs feature interviews with public figures such as members of the 
National Diet, government officials, and decision makers from various social and eco-
nomic sectors of society. They focus on “hot” political, social, or economic issues that 
attract considerable public attention. Clips from the interviews are often replayed later 
on news programs, whereas remarks made by politicians may be headlined the next 
day in leading national newspapers. Questions in these programs are posed mainly by 
prominent journalists who also function as moderators. Their role is to open and close 
the interview, invite other guests to present questions to the interviewees, and chal-
lenge unsatisfactory responses. There are also additional questions from scholars or 
experts (referred to as komenteitā or “commentators”) in areas such as public policy, 
social affairs, or economics. The moderators typically control the interviews, whereas 
the commentators participate only when invited to do so. Interaction characteristically 
takes the form of question–response sequences, with questions from the moderators 
and the commentators, responses from the interviewees.
The three programs at the center of this research differ from each other in their 
broadcast time, length of the interview session, the moderators’ questioning style and 
pursuit of detailed replies, and in particular their structure. Some of these shows may 
take the form of one-on-one interviews, other typically involve multiple participants, 
sometimes as many as 10 and thus enable others besides the principal questioner and 
responder to take part in the discussion. Shin Hōdō 2001, for example, hosts a multiple 
number of interviewees, and interviewers tend to present open-ended questions which 
are apparently easy to answer. It is more like a typical “talk show” in the sense that 
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other interviewees are also invited to present questions and to participate in the discus-
sion. Conversely, there are only up to two moderators in both the Puraimu Nyūsu and 
Gekiron Kurosufaya, and the guest-interviewees are limited in number, from one to 
three, and are asked questions for a lengthy time which enable the moderators to pur-
sue issues in detail. In Gekiron Kurosufaya, interviewees are posed by more exhaus-
tive questions, posed by the journalist Tahara Souichirō,2 who is known for his forceful 
inquiry style. For this reason, one can also expect diversity in reply in the different 
programs. In this study, we consider the three channels separately and try to observe if 
there are different types of reply patterns between politicians and nonpoliticians.
Notably, the interviews in this study were broadcast both before and after the general 
election of December 16, 2012, for the House of Representatives (the lower house of the 
National Diet). Since September 2009, the majority of seats in the lower house had been 
held by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ; or Minshutō), and its coalition partner, the 
People’s New Party (PNP; or Kokuminshintō). However, the election resulted in a disas-
trous defeat for the DPJ and an overwhelming victory for the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP; or Jimintō) and its partner the New Kōmei Party (NKP; Kōmeitō); they won a 
majority in the house and consequently established a new coalition administration. The 
result was a transfer of power from a center-left to a conservative and nationalist political 
grouping, hence, a significant realignment in the Japanese political spectrum.
TheData
The analysis was based on interviews broadcast 7½ months before the election and 6½ 
months afterwards (referred to subsequently as the first and second sessions). Over the 
whole period of 14 months (426 days), the three television programs featured a total 
of 1,356 interviews (3.2 interviewees per day) with 745 interviewees (359 in the first 
session and 386 in the second session), several of whom were interviewed more than 
once. On an individual basis, interviews were with 236 different individual politicians 
from the Diet (e.g., the prime minister, state ministers, Diet committees Chairmen, and 
secretary generals of political parties), 13 different politicians from the local level 
(prefectural governors including Tōkyō and Ōsaka and mayors), and 496 different 
nonpoliticians (e.g., university professors, social critics, economists, and retired politi-
cians, “experts” who are “competent” to speak on particular issues, making sense of 
them for the layperson; they are invited to share with the audience their knowledge and 
insight or to confirm the credibility of the news or current affairs, and their views are 
taken seriously precisely because they have been defined as “experts”). These inter-
views took place either in small groups or in one-on-one sessions. However, inter-
views with a single interviewee were selected wherever possible to focus primarily on 
question–response sequences between interviewer and interviewee. Only questions 
asked by the moderators and the “commentators” were included in this study.
From these 1,356 interviews, interviewees were selected as follows:
1. Every week, one national politician from the coalition government (whichever 
coalition was in power) and a second from the opposition parties were selected. 
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To assess the communication style employed by the Diet members, we also 
selected every week a nonpolitician, and, when available, a local-level politi-
cian (they were interviewed relatively infrequently).
2. Some of the politicians, especially high-echelon members (e.g., leaders of 
political parties, government ministers), gave more than one interview during 
the period of the study. However, to examine as varied a sample as possible, 
only one interview per person was included, usually the longest in duration.
In determining which national-level politicians to include in the study, special con-
sideration was allotted to the relative proportions of television appearances of mem-
bers of each of the political parties. In total, there were 236 interviews with individual 
Diet members, made up as follows (figures for the first and second sessions in paren-
theses): LDP 100 (37, 63); DPJ 76 (58, 18); NKP 13 (5, 8); Your Party (YP; Minna no 
tō) 10 (5, 5); Japanese Communist Party (JCP; Kyōsantō) 6 (4, 2); Japan Restoration 
Party (JRP; Nippon ishin no kai) 8 (2, 6); Tomorrow Party of Japan (TPJ; Nippon mirai 
no tō) 4 (3, 1); the Social Democratic Party (SDP; Shamintō) 3 (2, 1); the New 
Renaissance Party (NRP; Shintō kaikaku) 3 (2, 1); People’s Life Party (PLP; Seikatsu 
notō), formally People’s Life First (PLF; Kokumin no seikatsu ga daiichi), 4 (3, 1); the 
Sunrise Party of Japan (SPJ; Tachiagarenippon) 2 (2, 0); New Party Daichi-True 
Democrats (NPD; Shintō Daichi-Shinminshu) 2 (2, 0); the PNP 1 (1, 0); The Sunrise 
Party (SP; Taiyō no tō) 1 (1, 0); Tax Cuts Japan, Anti-TPP, Nuclear Phaseout Realization 
Party (TCJP; Genzei nippon, han TTP-datsu-genpatsu wo jitsugen suru tō) 1 (1, 0); 
Green Wind (GW; Midori no kaze) 1 (0, 1); and one unaffiliated politician 1 (1, 0).
To present these proportions, 133 interviews with national Diet politicians were 
selected, drawn from the different political parties as follows: LDP, 61 (20, 41); DPJ, 
38 (31, 7); JRP, 7 (3, 4); NKP, 6 (3, 3); YP, 6 (4, 2); PLP, 3 (2, 1); JCP, 3 (2, 1); SDP, 2 
(2, 0); PNP,1 (1, 0); NRP, 1 (1, 0); SPJ, 1 (1, 0); TCJP, 1 (1, 0); NPD, 1 (1, 0); GW, 1(0, 
1); and one unaffiliated politician, 1 (1, 0).
3.  For comparison purposes, there were 12 interviews with local politicians (6, 6) 
and 49 with nonpoliticians (29, 20).
In total, the sample consisted of 194 interviewees. Only 25 of the interviews took 
place on a one-to-one basis, 21 with two interviewees, and 148 with three interviewees 
or more. The longest interview lasted 45 minutes and 44 seconds, the shortest only 3 
minutes; the mean duration was 24 minutes and 36 seconds. The number of questions 
per interview ranged from 2 to 98, with a mean of 26.2 questions. In total, 5,084 ques-
tions were analyzed.
Procedure
Interviews from the three programs were recorded using a DVD recorder. A verbatim 
transcript was made of each selected interview. Based on a methodology used by the 
first author in previous research in Japan (Feldman, 2004, pp. 80-88), criteria for 
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identifying questions and responses were determined. Two coding sheets were devised 
for analyzing the structure and verbal content of the interviews: the first for inter-
viewer questions and the second for interviewee responses.
Questions.“. Questions” were regarded as utterances made by interviewers to elicit 
information from interviewees. Following Jucker (1986), questions were divided into 
two main groups: prefaced and nonprefaced. Prefaced questions are preceded by a 
main clause, such as “What do you think?” “What do you feel?” “Are you saying . . . 
?” “Are you suggesting . . . ?” “Will you explain . . . ?” “Could you say what . . . ?” or 
“Can I ask you . . . ?”, whereas the main propositional content of the question appears 
in indirect form in a subordinate clause. In nonprefaced questions, there is no such 
preceding main clause. Nonprefaced questions can be further subdivided according to 
whether or not they take interrogative syntax. There are three principal question forms 
that take interrogative syntax: (1) Polar questions are those “which seek a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
response in relation to the validity of (normally) an entire predication” (Quirk et al. 
1972, p. 52, cited in Jucker, 1986, p. 109); (2) interrogative-word questions are those 
that start with the words “what,” “why,” “who,” “when,” “where,” or “how”; and (3) 
disjunctive questions are those that pose a choice between two or more alternatives. 
Noninterrogative syntax questions include declaratives, imperatives, or moodless 
questions (i.e., those that lack a finite verb).
The total number of questions analyzed was 5,084, distributed across the television 
programs as follows:Puraimu Nyūsu 3,869 (76.1%), Shin Hōdō 2001957 (18.8%), and 
Gekiron Kurosufaya259 (5.1%). The high proportion drawn from the first program 
reflects the fact that it is broadcast 5 days a week for almost 2 hours. In this program, 
questions were posed by Sorimachi Osamu (member of the editorial board and politi-
cal desk commentator) and Yagi Akiko and Shimada Ayaka (both newscasters). In 
Shin Hōdō 2001, questions were usually presented by the moderators Suda Tetsuo 
(news anchor and TV Fuji news commentator) and Yoshida Kei (newscaster), and the 
political commentator Hirai Fumio (Fuji Television, News Desk, vice-chairman of the 
board of commentators). In Gekiron Kurosufaya, questions were asked principally by 
the main host Tahara (journalist) and also by Murakami Yuko (announcer).
Responses. The second coding sheet comprised several questions intended to analyze 
interviewee responses. Four were based on the four Bavelas et al. (1990) dimensions 
of sender, receiver, content, and context. However, whereas in the Bavelas et al. proce-
dure raters are asked to mark on a straight line the degree of equivocation for each 
dimension,in this study each dimension was assessed on a 6-point Likert-type scale 
(“neutral” was not included in these six possible responses, in order to force the rater 
to make a selection on the relative degree of equivocation).
Further modifications were made to Bavelas et al.’s (1990) four dimensions as 
follows:
1. Sender. Assessed by the question, “To what extent is the response the speaker’s own 
opinion (intention, observation, ideas)?” The scale consisted of six options, ranging 
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from (1) “It is obviously his/her personal opinion/ideas, not someone else’s” to (6) “It 
is obviously someone else’s opinion/ideas.”
As an example of an unequivocal response on the sender dimension, for example, 
explicit personal view, consider the following extract from an interview with 
Yamaguchi Natsuo, the representative of the NKP:
Sorimachi: I have heard from members of the LDP that during the last meeting of 
the leaders [of the leading three parties, the LDP, DPJ, and the NKP] it was dis-
closed that Prime Minister Noda [Yoshihiko] had promised at the last party lead-
ers’ meeting in August not to touch next year’s budget compilation. Mr. 
Yamaguchi, did you hear about it [during the] most recent [meeting]?
Yamagchi: I myself have not been notified about it last time, but I have confirmed 
it with Mr. Tanigaki [Sadakazu, former President of the LDP] on another occa-
sion. That is, because the new President [of the LDP] has changed to Mr. Abe 
[Shinzō]. Initially, Mr. Tanigaki passed on the information to the new President 
Abe. After that he passed it on to, well, notified, me. (Puraimu Nyūsu, October 
19, 2012)
In this instance, Yamaguchi clearly reveals (using the pronouns meaning “I” and 
“me”) his own ideas and observation regarding a given political event.
On the other hand, there are numerous cases in which interviewed politicians used 
no personal pronoun at all, leaving it unclear whose opinion they were expressing, or 
in which they used expressions that did not pinpoint the sender, such as “we,” “our 
party,” “politicians,” “it seems . . .” or “it is said . . .,” as we see from the following 
exchange between Sorimachi and Kasai Akira, the JCP’s Deputy Party Policy 
Committee. Sorimachi asked the Diet member about the Japan Coast Guard:
Sorimachi: From the perspective of JCP, is the size of the Japan Coast Guard today 
small?
Kasai: It is said that they do what is needed as a necessary police activity. (Puraimu 
Nyūsu, November 22, 2012)
Here, Kasai doesn’t express his own opinion: His words “It is said” are about as 
equivocal on the sender dimension as one can get! “It” might be the way things are 
perceived either in his party or the Japan Coast Guard, or anyone else, the media, per-
haps a common gossip, in either case, this is not his own personal view.
2. Receiver. Assessed by the question “To what extent is the message addressed to the 
other person in the situation?”
Because the original Bavelas et al. (1990) scales were devised for the analysis of 
dyadic conversations, the intended receiver is always clear. However, when the scale 
is extended to broadcast news interviews, there arises the issue of multiple receivers. 
Thus, when an interviewee responds to a question, it is not always clear whether the 
intended receiver is the interviewer or possibly another interviewee. It may also be the 
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general public, a particular segment of the public, or another politician or group of 
politicians, all of whom can be referred to as the “overhearing audience” (Heritage, 
1985).
The coding sheet in this study was intended to address this issue by posing the fol-
lowing question: “To what extent is the message addressed to the person(s) who asked 
the question?” that is, the interviewer (either the moderators or the commentators). 
Possible recipients were assessed on a 6-point scale, ranging from (1) “Obviously 
addressed to the moderators or the commentators” to (6) “Addressed to other people.”
Consider the following extract where the interviewed politician, Kamei Shizuka, 
formerMinister of State for Financial Services, unequivocally addressed Sorimachi, 
the interviewer, by referring a question to him:
Sorimachi: Mr. Kamei, it seems that YP, the JRP, and Ishihara [Shintarō]’s new 
party, these three parties are going to tentatively make up the axis of the “third 
pole” [that aims to replace the DPJ and the LDP]. I wonder if they can merge 
together as one party to plunge into the general election. What are your pros-
pects on this?
Kamei: Well, even if Fuji News Network [the television company that hosts him 
here] energize them to do so, it is impossible, it can’t be done. Mr. Sorimachi, do 
you think it would be possible? (Puraimu Nyūsu, November 6, 2012)
In contrast, the following exchange between Kakizawa Mito, the Vice Chairperson 
of the Policy Research Council of YP, and Suda illustrates an occurrence in which it is 
not clear to whom Kakizawa’s reply is aimed at (can be members of the JRP who 
attend the interview in the studio, or anybody else) and hence equivocal on the receiver 
dimension.
Suda: I will ask now Kakizawa from YP, is it possible [for your party] to merge 
with the JRP, this [topic] has also become now the focus of the news.
Kakizawa: When appearing on this program I looked forward enormously to decide 
on this, well, it is up to policy, policy is important. (Shin Hōdō 2001, November 
25, 2012)
3. Content. Assessed by the question, “How clear is the message in terms of what is 
being said?” The six options aimed to evaluate the various degrees of equivocation 
range from (1) “Straightforward, easy to understand, only one interpretation is possi-
ble” to (6) “Totally vague, impossible to understand, no meaning at all.”
For an example of a clear, understandable, and unequivocal reply, consider the fol-
lowing example from an interview between Tahara who challenged Sengoku Yoshito, 
the DPJ’s Acting Chairperson of the Policy Research Council and former Chief 
Cabinet Secretary:
Tahara: Well, Hmmm. In short, I [perceive] the nuclear power plant problem as an 
important one, but on the other hand, nuclear power plant er-, the trade deficit is 
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rapidly increasing. In this regard, er-, neither newspapers not television say any-
thing [on this issue]. Er Mr. Sengoku [what is your opinion]?
Sengoku: Yes. They don’t say much. (Gekiron Kurosufaya, June 2, 2012)
An opposite, a vague and ambiguous reply, is identified in the following extracts 
taken from the interview with Morimoto Satoshi, the Defense Minister, as the talk 
focused on the deployment of Osprey multimission hybrid American aircraft in Japan. 
While Tahara, the interviewer, is manipulating a model of the aircraft, he noted,
Tahara: The airplane is taking off this way, humm, and goes down this way.
Morimoto: It changes the nacelle, rotates it, changing the mode, like a helicopter it 
can rescue human life [move and] bring down Marine Corps, and has an amaz-
ing speed with its fixed wings.
Tahara: What speed can it reach?
Morimoto: More than double, but its radius of action is more than four times. 
(Gekiron Kurosufaya, July 21, 2012)
Morimoto’s reply is incomprehensible, hence, he completely fails to answer the 
question. Instead of indicating the speed of the aircraft in terms of miles or kilometers 
per hour, he gives some comparison figures, but it is not clear to what these numbers 
relate. It might be assumed that he was comparing the performance of the discussed 
aircraft with the helicopter used today in Japan, the Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight.
4. Context. The question used to assess this dimension was, “To what extent is this a 
direct answer to the question?” (Bavelas et al., 1990). The six options ranged from (1) 
“This is a direct answer to the question asked” through (6) “Totally unrelated to the 
question.”
An example illustratingan unequivocal reply comes from an interview with Iijima 
Isao, a special advisor to the Cabinet:
Sorimachi: With respect to the notification of withdrawal from YP, did you put out 
a new parliamentary group?”
Iijima: Not yet. (Puraimu Nyūsu, October 2, 2012)
An opposite example, of a reply totally unrelated to the question, is taken from an 
interview where Yagi challenged Watanabe Yoshimi the leader of YP:
Yagi: First, as you saw also in the VTR, the DPJ is divided on the vote in the House 
of Representatives over the bill of integrated reform of the social security sys-
tem. In any case, how do you perceive this situation?”
Watanabe: Well, you can clearly see that the DPJ has gotten into the process of 
dismantling. Ultimately, er-, the DPJ of [Prime Minister] Noda is saying exactly 
the same thing the LDP said three years ago, and I withdrew from the LDP three 
years ago. The administration at that time, the Asō [Tarō] administration, planned 
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the integrated reform of the tax and the social security, indeed this was the plan 
of the LDP’s Asō administration. Of course this [reform] was dictated by the 
Ministry of Finance, and [the administration of] Noda now became a second 
LDP as he is performing the ventriloquism’s role for the Ministry of Finance. On 
the other hand Ozawa [Ichirō] and his group, who once jumped out from the 
LDP, performing this time the same style. Tanaka [Kakuei] Faction, the Takeshita 
[Noboru] Faction were known as a unity box lunch.3But now Ozawa’s lunch box 
is tattered, sparse. It is not chock full, in comparison to the past Tanaka and 
Takeshita Factions is it like a sparse lunch box, it became a lunch box one has 
spilled or flaked. (Puraimu Nyūsu, July 9, 2012)
Obviously, Watanabe has not replied to the question regarding the DPJ division 
over the bill in the Diet. Instead, he begins his answer by stating that the DPJ has got-
ten into the process of falling apart and that the administration of Noda is acting 
exactly as the LDP did 3 years ago when Asō planned to follow the Ministry of Finance 
guidance and to pass the integrated reform of the tax and the social security in the Diet. 
Noda, according to Watanabe, also follows the directions from the Ministry of Finance. 
Then Watanabe criticizes Ozawa that he can’t build any solidarity within the group he 
leads and can’t play the coordinator role in politics the way his two political mentors 
and LDP bosses, Tanaka and Takeshita, used to do. Not only that Watanabe completely 
ignores the question he was asked, but also his response consists of an imprecise 
remarks.
One important point to be noted is that a message can be equivocal on any of the 
four above dimensions. So the content may be perfectly clear (unequivocal in terms of 
content), but not a direct answer to the question (equivocal on the context dimension). 
To illustrate, consider the following extract from an interview with Noda Seiko, the 
LDP’s Chairperson of the General Council:
Suda: Until the [approaching] upper house’s election, you face a great deal of work, 
including the selection of candidates, which is, of course, a task [by itself]. How 
about getting rid of the “twisted Diet” [divided Diet, where no party can claim 
overall control of both Japanese houses of parliament]?
Noda: Amongst the increasing number of problems I am facing, at any rate, the 
economic recovery is of immediate priority that needs to be taken care of. (Shin 
Hōdō 2001, January 6, 2013)
Here, Noda’s reply is very clear, easy to grasp (content dimension), and she also 
shares her own personal ideas (sender), but, at the same time, she fails to answer the 
question about the “twisted Diet” (context). As the ruling party’s Chairperson of the 
General Affairs Committee, Noda is, among other things, in charge of decisions on 
important matters relating to the Diet activities. Accordingly, the “twisted Diet” is 
obviously one of her uppermost concerns, as she is in constant negotiations with rep-
resentatives of other political parties to pass legislation and is familiar also with the 
strategies and tactics within her party toward winning the coming election (and thus 
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eliminating the divided Diet). But detailing her ideas on how to do away with the 
divided Diet may also invite criticism from her current partners to the negotiations, 
jeopardizing cooperation, and even members of her own party may show displeasure 
with her related remarks. The best method for Noda then is intentionally ignoring the 
question on how she intends to deal with the “twisted Diet” and trying to change the 
focus of attention while launching into another discussion, that is, her concern for the 
economic recovery.
Coding
The coding on the above four questions was conducted initially by a well-trained grad-
uate student. The training process involved studying the dimensions of the equivoca-
tion theory and a coding of a sample of 300 questions from the interviews while 
working closely with the main authors. The rater usually received the transcripts of 
several interviews and did the coding work independently. On completion of a set of 
interviews, a meeting was arranged with the main authors to discuss any problem that 
arose during the coding. This was resolved immediately through discussion. A sample 
of 300 questions was assigned to another rater to check intercoder reliability. The 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were 0.72 (for the sender dimension), 0.73 (receiver), 
0.85 (content), and 0.82 (context), all at the p< .001 level.
Results
The analysis is based on 194 interviews: 145 interviews with individual politicians (as 
opposed to interviews with two or more politicians simultaneously)—133 interviews 
with Diet members and 12 interviews with local-level politicians—and 49 interviews 
with nonpoliticians on three television channels. A total of 5,084 questions were iden-
tified. Politicians were asked 3,748 questions (73.7% of the total questions): Diet 
members who belonged (at the time of the interview) to the ruling coalition parties 
were challenged with 1,978 questions; opposition parties’ members 1,364 questions; 
and local-level politicians 406 questions. Nonpoliticians were asked 1,336 (26.3%) 
questions.
The 194 interviews were analyzed to explore interviewees’ responses to questions 
in terms of the four Bavelas et al. (1990) dimensions (sender, content, receiver, and 
context). From Table 1, it can be seen that mean average scores (on a scale of 1 to 6) 
were 3.26 (SD = 1.2) for the sender dimension, 3.98 (SD = 0.6) for the receiver dimen-
sion, 2.09 (SD = 1.1) for the content dimension, and 2.36 (SD = 1.5) for the context 
dimension. In other words, when Japanese politicians and nonpoliticians respond to 
questions during televised interviews, they are less likely to disclose their personal 
thoughts and opinions, tend often to address people other than the interviewers, incline 
to talk unclearly, and habitually do not directly answer the questions they had been 
asked.
As details in Table 2 show, of the 5,084 questions included in this study, only 509 
(10%) of the interviewees’ replies undoubtedly reflected their personal opinion and 
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Table 2. Complete, Full Reply on Each Dimension.
Dimensions
National 
politicians
Local 
politicians Nonpoliticians Total
Sender 298 (8.9%) 69 (17%) 142 (10.6%) 509 (10.0%)
Receiver 12 (0.4%) 1 (0.2%) 4 (0.3%) 17 (0.3%)
Content 1,279 (38.3%) 164 (40.4%) 526 (39.4%) 1,969 (38.7%)
Context 1,384 (41.4%) 177 (43.6%) 699 (52.3%) 2,260 (43.6%)
Totala 3,342 406 1,336 5,084
a. The Total represents the number of replies members of a given group gave during the interviews.
ideas, not someone else’s (sender dimension): National-level politicians had 298 such 
replies (8.9% of the replies they gave), local politicians 69 (17%), and nonpoliticians 
142 (10.6%). Only 17 replies (0.3%) were explicitly addressed to the person who 
asked the question (receiver): National-level politicians had 12 such replies (0.4% of 
the replies they gave), local politicians 1 (0.2%), and nonpoliticians 4 (0.3%). Merely 
1,969 (38.7%) were straightforward, easy to understand, with only one interpretation 
(content): National-level politicians had 1,279 (38.3% of the questions they were 
asked), local politicians 164 (40.4%), and nonpoliticians 526 (39.4%). Finally, of the 
5,084 questions included in this study, 2,260 (43.6%) were direct answers to the ques-
tion asked: National-level politicians had 1,384 (41.4% of the questions they were 
asked), local politicians 177 (43.6%), and nonpoliticians 699 (52.3%).
The significant correlation (+0.137) between the receiver and the content dimen-
sions (in Table 1) suggests that the interviewee responses directed to people (or orga-
nizations) other than the interviewers consisted of language that was less clear in terms 
of the content. Furthermore, the significant correlation (+0.540) between the content 
and the context dimensions indicates that interviewee responses that were not a direct 
answer to the question also tended to be vague and unclear.
To test Hypothesis 1 regarding possible differences in equivocation between politi-
cians and nonpoliticians, t tests were conducted on the four Bavelas et al. (1990) 
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations Between Variables.
1 2 3 4
1. Sender 1 .033* −.020 −.033*
2. Receiver — 1 .137** −.021
3. Content — — 1 .540**
4. Context — — — 1
Mean 3.26 3.98 2.09 2.36
SD 1.29 0.69 1.11 1.55
N 5,084 5,084 5,084 5,084
Note.N = number of questions asked. Mean ranges between 1 and 6.
*p< .05. **p< .01.
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dimensions of sender, receiver, content, and context. Results (presented in Table 3) 
show that the first hypothesis was supported. For the sender, the receiver, and the 
context dimensions, there are significant differences between politicians and nonpoli-
ticians. Thus, in comparison to nonpoliticians, decision makers (on both the national 
and the local levels) are less inclined to reply to questions asked and to disclose their 
own thoughts and ideas; they are also more inclined to address other people rather than 
the interviewers. Only the content dimension revealed no statistical difference between 
the two groups.
A related question that is of interest in this regard is, “To what extent the respondents’ 
responses differ according to the televised program?” As mentioned, the three programs 
at the center of this research differ from each other in their broadcast time, structure, 
length of the interview session, and in the moderators’ questioning style and pursuit of 
detailed replies. We focused then on the three channels separately and tried to observe if 
there are different types of reply patterns between politicians and nonpoliticians.
In Table 4, t value of the four dimensions for nonpoliticians and politicians (both 
national and local) are presented for Shin Hōdō 2001. These results showedthat politi-
cians tended to equivocate significantly more than nonpoliticians on the sender, 
receiver, and context dimensions. The limited sample of the local-level politicians 
(only six questions) makes it difficult to compare the local and the national-level poli-
ticians. Yet if we assume that this limited sample is representative, then the t test for 
both level of politicians indicates a significant difference regarding the context and the 
sender dimensions: Diet members tend more to equivocate on these dimensions. We 
further compare politicians and nonpoliticians by conducting Tukey’s honest signifi-
cant difference test.4 This revealed that only in regard to the sender there was signifi-
cant difference between the local-and the national-level politicians.
Table 5 illustrates similar data for politicians and nonpoliticians on Gekiron 
Kurosufaya. The t test for politicians and nonpoliticians reveals significant differences 
Table 3. Comparisons of the Means, SD, Standard Error of the Means, and t Value of the 
Four Dimensions for Politicians and Nonpoliticians.
Politicians/
Nonpolitician N Mean SD
Standard error 
of the mean t value
Sender Politicians 3,748 3.34 1.280 .021 6.75***
Nonpoliticians 1,336 3.06 1.281 .035
Receiver Politicians 3,748 4.03 0.698 .011 8.36***
Nonpoliticians 1,336 3.85 0.650 .018
Content Politicians 3,748 2.10 1.120 .018 1.84
Nonpoliticians 1,336 2.04 1.065 .029
Context Politicians 3,748 2.44 1.574 .026 7.22***
Nonpoliticians 1,336 2.10 1.447 .040
Note.N = number of questions asked. Mean ranges between 1 and 6.
***p< .001.
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Table 4. Comparisons of the Means, SD, Standard Error of the Means, and t Value of the 
Four Dimensions for Politicians and Nonpoliticians in Shin Hōdō 2001 Program.
Dimensions Sample N Mean SD
Standard error 
of the mean
t Value/
difference mean
Sender Nonpoliticians 32 2.25 1.107 .196 −2.832***
Politicians 227 2.93 1.283 .085
 National 221 2.96 1.280 .086 2.463**
 Local 6 1.67 0.516 .211 1.293**
Receiver Nonpoliticians 32 3.91 0.390 .069 −3.783***
Politicians 227 4.21 0.631 .042
 National 221 4.22 0.626 .042 1.493
 Local 6 3.83 0.753 .307 0.388
Content Nonpoliticians 32 1.97 0.861 .152 −2.229***
Politicians 227 2.34 1.079 .072
 National 221 2.34 1.078 .072 −0.359
 Local 6 2.50 1.225 .500 −0.161
Context Nonpoliticians 32 2.31 1.655 .293 0.592
Politicians 227 2.49 1.567 .104
 National 221 2.52 1.574 .106 2.841**
 Local 6 1.50 0.837 .342 1.016
Note.N = number of questions asked. Mean ranges between 1 and 6.
***p< .001. **p< .01.
in the content and the receiver dimensions. For the receiver, as in the case of the previ-
ous television program, remarks of the politicians are most often directed at other 
people than the moderators, but for the content, unlike the Shin Hōdō 2001, the replies 
of the nonpoliticians are more vague and unclear. This reflects perhaps the fact that in 
Gekiron Kurosufaya, nonpoliticians are posed by more exhaustive questions posed by 
the journalist Tahara who is known for his forceful inquiry style. The t tests between 
Diet members and local-level politicians indicate a significant difference on the 
receiver and the sender dimensions. In both cases, the local-level politicians tend to 
equivocate more. A multiple comparisons also to the nonpolitician indicate further a 
significant statistical difference even in the context dimension. Local politicians 
equivocate more on the sender and the receiver dimensions, but Diet members’ replies 
are less clear (the content dimension). The reason for this finding is perhaps related to 
the interview with (the local) Ōsaka Mayor Hashimoto Tōru. He was interviewed as 
the Mayor, but since he served also as the coleader of the JRP, he tried in his replies to 
present the views held in this party, often appealing more to the viewers rather than 
addressing the interviewer. Yet his remarks were easy to understand. On the other 
hand, in regard to Diet members, the more they gave replies to detailed topics posed to 
them, the less clear their talk was.
Finally, Table 6 compares the nonpoliticians and the two politician groups in 
Puraimu Nyūsu program. In comparison with the previous two television programs, 
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Puraimu Nyūsu is aired from Monday through Friday, and in this study, we were able 
to gather the largest sample from this program. The t test reveals that on all the four 
dimensions, there are significant differences between nonpoliticians and politicians: 
Diet members clearly gave less complete but yet more vague replies than nonpoliti-
cians. The t test indicates also a difference between the local-and the national-level 
politicians regarding the sender and the content dimensions: Diet members tend to talk 
as clearly as they can (the content dimension) yet less disclose their personal opinions 
(the sender dimension) as they try to present the lines of their political parties; local-
level politicians, in comparison, feeling less committed to their local organizations, 
reveal their own views, but conversely their talk is most often vague and less clear.
To test Hypothesis 2 regarding the differences in responses between members of 
the ruling and the opposition camps, two analyses were performed: the first on the 
period before the 16 December general election when the DPJ and the PNP were in 
power (see Table 7) and the second on the period after the general election when the 
LDP and the NKP were in power (see Table 8). The results of these analyses showed 
that whichever coalition grouping was in power, they were significantly more likely to 
equivocate, thereby supporting Hypothesis 2. Both coalition groups were significantly 
more likely to provide less direct answers to questions (the context dimension). DPJ 
politicians in government were significantly more likely to provide fuzzy and unclear 
responses (content), whereas LDP politicians in government were significantly less 
Table 5. Comparisons of the Means, SD, Standard Error of the Means, and t Value of the 
Four Dimensions for Politicians and Nonpoliticians inGekiron Kurosufaya Program.
Dimensions Sample N Mean SD
Standard error 
of the mean
t Value/
difference mean
Sender Nonpoliticians 287 3.31 1.134 .067 0.439
Politicians 670 3.28 1.273 .049
 National 601 3.24 1.276 .052 −2.367*
 Local 69 3.62 1.201 .144 −.3819*
Receiver Nonpoliticians 287 3.72 0.707 .041 −6.445***
Politicians 670 4.03 0.637 .024
 National 601 4.00 0.639 .026 −3.827***
 Local 69 4.29 0.571 .068 −.2815*
Content Nonpoliticians 287 2.14 1.126 .066 3.473***
Politicians 670 1.87 1.033 .040
 National 601 1.91 1.053 .043 −1.446
 Local 69 1.52 0.759 .091 .388*
Context Nonpoliticians 287 2.44 1.622 .096 −1.499
Politicians 670 2.61 1.633 .063
 National 601 2.58 1.609 .066 −1.466
 Local 69 2.88 1.819 .219 −0.300
Note.N = number of questions asked. Mean ranges between 1 and 6.
***p< .001. **p< .01. *p< .05.
84 Journal of Language and Social Psychology 34(1)
Table 6. Comparisons of the Means, SD, Standard Error of the Means, and t Value of the 
Four Dimensions for Politicians and Nonpoliticians in Puraimu Nyūsu Program.
Dimensions Sample N Mean SD
Standard error 
of the mean
t Value/difference 
mean
Sender Nonpoliticians 1,017 3.01 1.310 .041 −7.846***
Politicians 2,851 3.38 1.275 .023
 National 2,520 3.45 1.248 .024 8.457***
 Local 331 2.80 1.332 .073 .6543***
Receiver Nonpoliticians 1,017 3.88 0.636 .020 −5.310***
Politicians 2,851 4.01 0.714 .013
 National 2,520 4.01 0.709 .014 −0.950
 Local 331 4.05 0.751 .041 −0.041
Content Nonpoliticians 1,017 2.01 1.052 .033 −3.179***
Politicians 2,851 2.13 1.134 .021
 National 2,520 2.11 1.117 .022 −2.275*
 Local 331 2.28 1.252 .068 −.1645*
Context Nonpoliticians 1,017 2.00 1.373 .043 −7.679***
Politicians 2,851 2.40 1.558 .029
 National 2,520 2.41 1.555 .031 0.518
 Local 331 2.36 1.580 .087 0.047
Note.N = number of questions asked. Mean ranges between 1 and 6.
***p< .001. *p< .05.
Table 7. Comparisons of the Average Values for the Ruling and Opposition Parties’ 
Politicians (During the DPJ Administration).
Dimensions Coalition/opposition N Mean SD
Standard error 
of the mean t Value
Sender Coalition (DPJ, PNP) 903 3.45 1.294 .043 1.55
Opposition (LDP, 
NKP, etc.)
1,059 3.35 1.346 .041
Receiver Coalition (DPJ, PNP) 903 3.96 0.710 .024 −1.55
Opposition (LDP, 
NKP, etc.)
1,059 4.01 0.729 .022
Content Coalition (DPJ, PNP) 903 2.17 1.125 .037 4.33**
Opposition (LDP, 
NKP, etc.)
1,059 1.95 1.052 .032
Context Coalition (DPJ, PNP) 903 2.57 1.583 .053 2.62*
Opposition (LDP, 
NKP, etc.)
1,059 2.38 1.563 .048
Note.N = number of questions asked. Mean ranges between 1 and 6. DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan; 
PNP = People’s New Party; LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; NKP = New Kōmei Party.
*p< .01. **p< .001.
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likely to reveal their own thoughts on the question topic (sender) and to appeal to other 
people and organizations rather than the interviewer (receiver).
Discussion
The results of this study show a striking level of equivocation by both national-and 
local-level politicians during televised political interviews. Politicians equivocate sig-
nificantly more than nonpoliticians, and national-level Diet members equivocate sig-
nificantly more than local-level politicians, especially on the sender and the receiver 
dimensions. For those national politicians, broadcast interviews serve as an opportu-
nity to publicize the views that are prevalent in the political groups they represent or 
lead. Accordingly, they aim their replies not at the interviewer who sits in front of them 
but rather at their supporters, the electorate, and members of other political parties and 
officials who are their partners in the political game.
From a broad political communication viewpoint, however, this tendency is reason-
able and acceptable. After all, high-echelon, experienced politicians who are invited 
for televised political interviews, are also expected to reveal not only their own per-
sonal views and stances on important issues but also those of members who they work 
with: their colleagues from political parties and factions who share political beliefs 
and policy orientations. Moreover, those who are invited to televised interviews are 
not anticipated to have a private, closed, and intimate talk with the interviewers; rather, 
they are expected to send their messages to “overhearing audience,” to be heard, seen, 
and evaluated by the general public and potential supporters, as these politicians try to 
Table 8. Comparisons of the Average Values for the Ruling and the Opposition Parties’ 
Politicians (During the LDP Administration).
Dimensions Coalition/opposition N Mean SD
Standard error 
of the mean t Value
Sender Coalition (LDP, NKP) 1,074 3.44 1.142 .035 3.91**
Opposition (DPJ, 
PNP, etc.)
306 3.13 1.256 .072
Receiver Coalition (LDP, NKP) 1,074 4.05 0.639 .019 −2.69*
Opposition (DPJ, 
PNP, etc.)
306 4.17 0.685 .039
Content Coalition (LDP, NKP) 1,074 2.18 1.139 .035 1.44
Opposition (DPJ, 
PNP, etc.)
306 2.08 1.084 .062
Context Coalition (LDP, NKP) 1,074 2.50 1.576 .048 3.68**
Opposition (DPJ, 
PNP, etc.)
306 2.14 1.461 .084
Note.N = number of questions asked. Mean ranges between 1 and 6. DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan; 
PNP = People’s New Party; LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; NKP = New Kōmei Party.
*p< .01. **p< .001.
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increase political awareness and followership to their groups. The sender and the 
receiver dimensions in this regard are probably less suitable as criteria for assessment 
of the responsiveness of public officials to questions.
In contrast, the content and the context dimensions are decisive in this sense because 
interviewee politicians are expected to talk in a language that will be easily understood 
by the diversified segments of the “overhearing audience” and to reply directly to the 
interview question. In this study, however, interviewees, especially politicians, equiv-
ocated in the majority of their replies regarding both dimensions. Diet members’ 
responses contain less explicit and less easy-to-understand remarks than nonpolitician 
and local-level politicians, as they confine their talk to a bland statement, or they are 
difficult to grasp double talk. Likewise, national-level politicians provide less direct 
replies than their counterparts from the local level, and significantly much less that the 
nonpoliticians. Very often, it is obvious that national-and local-level politicians are 
trying to convey certain opinions through the media regardless of what question they 
are asked. They give incomplete replies, talk at length about issues that have little rela-
tion to the topic introduced by the interviewer as they try to channel attention to the 
working of the political system and the function of political groups.
Noteworthy in particular, in this regard, are the attitudes of members of the parties 
that dominate political power in Japan: Without regard to their political party, those 
who rule the country at any given time communicate in the same style. That is, in 
comparison to members of the opposition camp, members of the ruling coalition par-
ties tend to reply less directly to interview questions and talk less clearly. This finding 
is of importance here, indicating that, as hypothesized, that those who are in control of 
the country are more vulnerable to communicative conflicts that will lead them to 
equivocate when replying to questions. This is in contrast to members of the opposi-
tion parties, who face less controversial questions and have less responsibility in the 
decision-making process and thus, relatively speaking, “can say what they like.”
An important factor correlated with the communicative conflicts and what should 
be considered in future work is the quality of the questions posed during televised 
political interviews. Can they be rated in terms of degree of aggression or complexity, 
and does this affect the level and kind of equivocation that follows?
The rate of politicians’ direct replies (context dimension) in televised interviews in 
Japan (barely 41.4% and 43.6% for the national-and the local-level politicians, respec-
tively) is closely parallel to data available about similar television shows in the United 
Kingdom and Taiwan where the proportion of questions that receive a direct answer is 
as low as less than 40% (Bull, 1994; Harris, 1991; Huang, 2009). The fact that Japanese 
politicians tend to equivocate much more than nonpoliticians (the later directly replied 
to 52.3% of the questions) may suggest that at least on the context dimension, it is not 
simply a reflection of the often-noted general tendency toward equivocation in 
Japanese society, which is said to be due to cultural factors. It may be that politicians 
tend to equivocate because they face a communicative conflict, which Bull and his 
colleagues (1996) coined “level of threat,” and face tougher questions. Considering 
the evidence provided from other countries, which supports the notion that politicians 
do not reply to a large proportion of questions in political interviews, one could say 
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that the behavior of Japanese politicians seems to resemble that of other politicians 
more than it resembles the behavior of other Japanese.
In conclusion, equivocation can be seen both as a response to communicative con-
flicts and in terms of the cultural context in which it occurs. For a skilled communica-
tor, politicians or others, equivocation can be a highly effective instrument of 
self-disclosure and self-presentation. Public official in particular employ the art of 
equivocation as an important element of their political skill, using ambiguous, even 
evasive language, as a strategy for turning difficult situations to their own advantage. 
As this article indicates, interviewees in Japan also equivocate probably for the same 
reasons, and the effectiveness of this type of communication strategy should be exam-
ined further in cross-cultural, cross-national studies.
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Notes
1. Among these programs, known as tōron bangumi, or debate programs, are NHK’s Nichiyō 
tōron (Sunday’s Debate); Nippon Television Network’s U-ēkuappu! Purasu (Wake-Up! 
Plus); TV Asahi Network’s Hōdō sutēshon sandē (News Station Sunday); TBS network’s 
jiji hōdan (Free Talk on Current Events); TV Tokyo’s Tase yasuhiro no shūkan nyūsu 
shinsho (Tase Yasuhiro’s Weekly News Book); Fuji Television’s Bīesu fuji raivu puraimu 
nyūsu (BS Fuji Live Prime News); and a variety of show programs, including TV Asahi’s 
Bīto takeshi no TV takkuru (Beat Takeshi TV Tackle) and Yomiuri TV network’s Takajin 
no soko made itte iinkai (Committee to Say Up to There). (In Japanese vowels can either be 
short or long; a diacritical mark, e.g., ō, ū, ē, or ā over the vowel indicates that it is a long 
vowel.)
2. Personal names are given in the Japanese order, that is, family name first.
3. Watanabe refers to the fact that these LDP factions held regular weekly meetings where 
they practiced “itchi kessoku hako bentô,” literally, building solidarity while eating boxed 
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lunches.This practice symbolized the solidarity and team-work that was vital to the sur-
vival of the faction and its ability to win positions of power and influence.
4. If we divide the sample of the three groups, that is, Diet members, local-level politicians, 
and nonpoliticians, and perform t test twice, there is a risk of causing a Type I error or 
an error of the first kind. Therefore, by performing multiple comparisons, we reduce the 
concern of having this error. One can perform here multiple comparisons with the Kruskal–
Wallis test, a nonparametric test used to compare three or more samples, but yet we used 
the t test here, and thus the Tukey’s honest significant difference is commonly accepted. 
Notably, a Kruskal–Wallis test that was carried out to the multiple comparison (Bonferroni 
correction) in our sample revealed significant differences between the national-and the 
local-level politicians regarding the sender dimension in both the Shin Hōdō 2001and the 
Puraimu Nyūsu, and in the receiver and the content dimensions in Gekiron Kurosufaya.
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